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The dissolution of Nepal’s Constituent Assembly (CA) without
delivering a constitution has derailed Nepal’s slow political transition and
the peace process. This critical rupture in interparty relations is a clear
departure from what since November 2005 had become a familiar pattern
– a last minute deal at the end of a protracted period of brinkmanship.
Although the CA dissolution was the direct result of Nepal’s Supreme
Court order setting May 27 as the deadline for the CA to either deliver or
dissolve, it was the lack common grounds among the political parties on
the basic principles of state restructuring – federalism – that pushed them
over the cliff.
The end of the CA has amplified Nepal’s political uncertainties.
The question that looms large is whether Nepal’s political parties will
continue to work together to deliver a constitution that regularizes
democratic process or whether they will drift further apart and endanger
the gains already achieved. My paper argues that the basic dynamics
underlying Nepal’s current political transformations remains unchanged.
Cooperation among Nepal’s political parties has been the most crucial
factor in this transformation. Interparty cooperation among Nepal’s
political parties and the critical role of Nepal’s neighbors are the two
linchpins of this dynamics. How will these internal and external factors
impact Nepali politics in the new context of CA dissolution? In the
following sections, I identify five broader patterns that have set the
contours of Nepal’s current political transition and then I follow up with
brief explanations of the same. These five patterns are (a) interparty
cooperation amidst widening participation, (b) confrontation to
conciliation and then confrontation again, (c) deepening distrust, (d)
assertiveness of the judiciary or judicial activism, and (e) the key role of
external actors.
There is only a short history of serious interparty cooperation in Nepal.
It began in late 1980s and was a driving force behind what now is known
as Nepal’s first Democracy Movement, which heralded a multiparty
system under the 1990 constitution. Soon, however, the political parties
drifted apart amidst intense rivalries for power. The Maoist insurgency of
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1996 was the severest blow to this new democracy. The assassination of
King Birendra in summer 2001, led to fresh attempts by the new King
Gyanendra, to push back Nepal’s democratic forces, which, in turn,
brought the political parties closer.
Historical 2005 Understanding and the CA Elections
The CA elections of April 2008 marked the realization of long
delayed historical undertaking for Nepal. Provision for a CA was a major
part of the Delhi Accord of 1950 also, but King Mahendra sidelined the
CA elections then. The demand for CA elections resurfaced when the
Communist Party of Nepal- Maoist declared insurgency; the CA was one
of its forty demands. CA was one of the main points on which Nepal’s
other political parties had to yield to the Maoists to reach the November
2005 understanding to end the Maoist insurgency; this understanding
proved a watershed in the interparty cooperation in Nepal. Political parties
showed an unprecedented determination to narrow their differences to
further Nepal’s democratization process. The results were phenomenal.
The April 2006 popular movement was a joint effort of all the political
parties including the Maoists. It forced King Gyanendra to restore the
national assembly that he had been dissolved in October 2002. A sweeping
declaration by this resurrected assembly shifted the locus of power from
the palace to this assembly and new constitution, including the loyalty of
Nepal’s military. In April 2008, CA elections were held. The new CA
during its first meeting abolished Nepal’s monarchy and declared the
country a republic. These were bold achievements in a short time,
compared to other democratic movements that achieved their goals
incrementally, a process known as “democratization on installment plan.”4
In the rest of this paper, I briefly explain major patterns that have emerged
from interparty interactions in Nepal since the 2005 understanding in the
hope that they might offer some clue to the likely future scenario.
Nepal’s political parties also narrowed their differences on the
thorniest issues of federal model and the form of government. In April
2012, the UCPN (Maoist) leaders said that the party was sticking to its
revised 10-state model. The NC leaders pushed for the seven-state model.
The UML, on the other hand, took a softer stance with its readiness to
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consider 7-12 states models.5 The dissolution of the CA occurred amidst
growing agreement among the political stakeholders over issues that had
taken the longest to resolve. The closing of the Maoist combatant camps
though integration of thousands of combatants into Nepal Army and
through rehabilitation programs and packages for thousand others was
indeed a major breakthrough.6 By May 15th the political parties announced
an agreement on all major issues, including the number of states and a
mixed political system with popularly elected President and a Prime
Minister chosen by the parliament.
Nepal’s case supports a wider recognition in democratization
literature of the critical role of “contingent interactions among key
political actors” in driving the success or failure of democratization.7
Bermeo, for example, attributes the breakdown of democracy to the
refusal by a substantial sector of the civilian elites to “compromise or
bargain and abide by the outcome of the democratic game.” Democracies,
she says, are “recreated piece by piece, institution by institution, and the
creators are usually old enemies.” Nepal’s case also vindicates Lijphart’s
thesis that “consociationalism is possible only when elites understand the
perils of political fragmentation.” 8 Studies on Latin America and
Southern Europe have compared the consequences of elite settlements
with “social revolutions” and underlined the need for more scholarly
attention to this phenomenon. Cohen finds deep suspicion between
moderate sides of each other’s intentions as a key factor that led them to
cooperate with extremists and produced the outcome that none of them
favored. 9

5

<http://www.nepalnews.com/archive/2012/apr/apr28/news08.php> accessed June
20, 2012.
6

<http://www.ekantipur.com/2011/11/02/top-story/how-the-agreement-was-finallysealed/343092.html> accessed August 15, 2012.
7

Michael Bratton, and Nicholas van de Walle. “Neopatrimonial Regimes and
Political Transitions in Africa,” World Politics 46 (July 1994), p. 454.
8

Nancy Bermeo, 1992 “Democracy and lessons of Dictatorship,” Comparative
Politics 24:3, (April 1992), pp. 273-281.
9

Youssef Cohen, Radicals, Reformers and Reactionaries (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 6-7

34

Himalayan Journal of Development and Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2012
Confrontation to conciliation and then, confrontation again
continue to define interactions between Nepal’s political parties. For
example, Nepal’s non-Maoist parties reached out to the Maoists only after
their demand for restoration of popular rule was repeatedly rejected by the
King. Nepal’s major political parties dismissed the Maoists’ strength until
they captured a large swath of Nepal’s territory and challenged the state,
including the democratic leaders. Once the Maoists joined the government
in 2007, the governing coalition adopted the same dismissive stance
towards others raising demands upon the state for greater inclusion. For
example, in 2007, the government faced a strong movement in Nepal’s
southern plain region by Madhesis for broadening their participation in the
state. The government yielded to their demands only after prolonged
confrontation that resulted in dozens of deaths.
Despite continuing interactions between the political parties, deep
distrust among the parties still persists. For example, both the Nepali
Congress and CPN-UML leaders keep saying that they cannot trust the
Maoists. The differences between the political parties increased in the
wake of the CA elections and in the formation of a Maoist led coalition.
Deep distrust became once more evident in the last rounds of talks to save
the CA when the party leaders blamed each other for the CA dissolution.
Cut throat competition inside political parties between rivals for power
also delays and derails sensible negotiations.
In the political vacuum left by the incessant partisan rivalry among
parties, Nepal’s judiciary has seized a greater role. The judiciary did not
obstruct any of the sweeping measures in the wake of the April 2006
Movement, including the House Declaration stripping the king of most of
his powers. Subsequently, however, the government’s relationship with
the judiciary has suffered. Nepal’s judicial leaders have been deeply
resentful of the Interim Constitution provision subjecting the appointment
of judges to parliamentary hearing and recommendation. The Maoists
were especially insistent on parliamentary oversight of the judiciary. The
judges have been emboldened to go on offensive against the political
establishment in view of both interparty differences and denuding popular
approval of political leaders. As noted earlier, the biggest judicial blow to
Nepali politicians came from the Supreme Court’s order rejecting
extension of the CA beyond May 27.
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No account of Nepal’s political milieu will be complete without
including vital role of Nepal’s neighbors, especially India. Extensive
Indian involvement has underpinned each critical decision ranging from
the 2005 understanding to government formation. In a rare
acknowledgement, the Maoist leader Pushpa Dahal has characterized
India’s support as critical to the success of Nepal’s peace process. 10 In
February 2008, Nepal’s Madhesi leaders and the mainstream political
parties reached an agreement in the premises of the Indian Embassy with
the direct involvement of the then Ambassador S. P. Mukherjee. When the
Maoist Prime Minister Prachand resigned over the President’s decision to
restore the COAS overriding the cabinet decision to fire him, Nepali
commentators openly noted the non-Maoist parties rallying with India in
support of this decision. Rising Indian involvement has also led to
expedited Chinese diplomacy in Nepal. Many Nepali observers see the
country fast turning into a battleground for influence between major
powers leaving less and less room for Nepali political actors to find
solutions on their own.
The Future Scenario
Despite all the volatility, Nepal has certainly become more
democratic since 2006. Popular sovereignty has become indeed dear to
the people. There are many more stakeholders in Nepali politics today
than ever before. Grassroots mobilization has never been more powerful.
Regions, classes, castes, religious communities are all joining the fray to
have their demands/aspirations included in the state restructuring process.
Pressure to accommodate diversity has risen across the board. However,
the substantial progress made before the CA’s dissolution could dissolve
under the heat of the new CA elections. This could further complicate and
prolong the political ordeal of the Nepalese people.
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